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FACTOR MARKET STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY CIDICE

IN THE COLOMBIAN BRICK INDUSTRY

Mary Ann Baily
Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between factor markets and a
pattern of technology choice such that capital-intensity is correlated with
size.

Empirical evidence shows that wages vary positively with size of firm

even after correcting for education, experience, turover and firm location.
Secondary source evidence suggests that capital access differs across
entrepreneurs, according to characteristics relating to their positions
in Colombian society.

These assumptions are combined in a simple model

which can generate the technology pattern observed.
This imperfect market model is compared to the hypothesis that
capital access improves over a firm's lifetime, so that the pattern repre
sents a growth path.

The

evidence does not tend to support this hypothesis.

FACTOR MARKET STRUCTURE AND TErnNOLOGY CHOICE
IN THE COLOMBIAN BRICK INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION

Casual observa tion and industry level data suggest that in many
develop ing countrie s, industry structur e exhibits a common pattern.
is great variatio n in size of firm.

There

Large firms seem to be more capital

intensiv e, to pay higher average wages and to have more favorabl e access
to investm ent funds than small firms.
Given the high tmemployment in most developi ng countrie s, and
the desire of governm ents to encourag e investme nt with high employm ent
generati ng impact, this structur e is of obvious policy signific ance.

How

ever, casual observa tion has often proved misleadi ng in the past in
develop ing countrie s, and industry level statisti cs can be difficu lt to
interpr et.

The measure s of output, capital and labor are generall y weak, and

the level of aggrega tion is high.
does not really exist.

Thus, it could be argued that the phenomenon

Since heteroge neous products are being aggregat ed

togethe r in one industry , and the measure of labor does not allow for
differen ces in skill level, it could be that the industry statisti cs are
really aggrega ting together a series of differen t industr ies, with differen t
product ion function s.

There is a represen tative firm in each of the

industr ies which uses a differen t combina tion of skilled labor, unskille d labor.
and capital , and is of a differen t scale.
Thus one might ask, does the pattern describe d above really exist
at the microeco nomic level within a more narrowly specifie d industry .

If

-2so, what is the relationship among size, capital-intensity and the structure
of capital and labor markets, such that this pattern is produced.
In this paper, we present evidence from a micro-level study of
one industry in one developing country:

the clay brick industry in Colombia.

The paper is based on survey data from an interview study of individual firms
and on secondary sources on the structure of Colombian labor and capital
markets.

We find that there is great variation in technology choice across

firms and capital-intensity is correlated with the size of firm.

Evidence

is presented on the existence of structural imperfections in the labor and
capital markets.

A simple analytical model is used to show that these

imperfections are consistent with the patterns of technology choice observed.

CHARACTERIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY CHOICE
The main processes in the production of clay bricks are the exca
vation and preparation of the clay, the forming and drying of the raw bricks,
and the firing of the bricks in kilns.

For each process, there is a variety

of alternatives available, from purely manual to highly mechanized.
After preliminary factoryvisits and discussion with local industry
experts, the Colombian industry was divided into eight major categories of
technology choice, based on the major alternative choices observed in the
forming, drying and firing processes:

(The choices are arranged here from

most to least capital-intensive, within each process).
Forming:

semi-dry press process
extrusion with de-airing-imported process
Colombian adaptation
without de-airing
manual molding

-3Drying:

artificial drying - tunnel dryer

chamber dryer
natural drying
Firing:

continuous kiln - tunnel kiln
Hoffmann kiln

intermittent kiln - vertical flame (updraught) or inverted
flame (downdraught)
A brief description of the alternatives:
The simplest method of forming bricks is by hand in simple wooden molds.
In the extrusion process, the bricks are extruded by machine as a column of
clay which is then cut with a wirecutting machine.

A denser, stronger product

can be made by removing some of the air from the bricks during extrusion,
using a more complex machine.

In the semi-dry process, much of the moisture

in the clay is artifically removed first and the clay is then pressed by
machine.
The most common drying method in Colombia is to store the bricks in
sheds, which are open at the sides and covered on top, until the bricks dry
naturally.
bricks.

In a chamber dryer, hot air is circulated around the formed

The tunnel dryer is a continuous process dryer, in which bricks

move on cars through a tunnel as warm air is passed over them.
Firing the bricks in intermittent kilns is a batch process.

The

bricks are placed in the kiln, fired, allowed to cool and then removed
from the kiln.
process.

The Hoffma~n kiln transforms the firing into a continuous

It is composed of a series of individual chambers.

The fire is

moved from one chamber to the next and the bricks are continually loaded
and unloaded in sequence as the fire moves and each chamber cools.

The

-4tunnel kiln also involves a continuous firing process, but the fire is
stationary and the product aoves through the kiln on cars.
Table 1 shows the coni>inations of choices represented by the eight
categories.

We should note that by specifying the industry narrowly,

product heterogeneity was greatly lessened but not eliminated.

Within

the -clay brick industry, there are different products varying in char
acteristics which are related to variations in choice of technology.
However the products are much closer substitutes than in broader industry
classifications and no category produces a product which has no close
substitute produced by some other category.
In the survey, each firm was classified into one of the eight
categories.

Then capital-labor ratios were computed for categories 2

to 8 from detailed data gathered from one or two representative plants in
each category and from other industry sources such as capital goods
importers.

The capital figure was the approximate cost in Colombian pesos1

of purchasing plant and equipment new in 1975 plus the costs of construction
in 1975 (kilns, drying sheds, and simple factory shelters).
number of full-time production workers employed per month.

Labor was the
In Table 1. the

categories are numbered from most to least capital-intensive.
This procedure could not be used for category 1, which consists
of a single firm using a sophisticated capital-intensive process and
producing on an extremely large scale.

This firm refused to cooperate

with the study, and can therefore be incorporated in the analysis only.to
the extent that information about it is available from other sources.
Although a capital-labor ratio could not be computed, there is no doubt
that this category is the most capital-intensive.

I

II'\

I

Table 1:

Categories of Technology Choice

~tegory
Process ,~

1

2

3

4

Forming

Semi-Dry
Press
Process

Extrusion
with
De-airing:
Imported
Process

Extrusion
with
De-airing:
Imported
Process

Drying

Tunnel
Drying

Combination *
of Tunnel
and Natural
Drying

Combination ill
of Chamber
Natural
and Natural Drying
Drying

Tunnel

Tunnel
Kiln

Hoffman
Kiln

Firing

Kiln

5

Extrusion Extrusion
with
with
De-airing: De-airing:
Imported
Imported
Process
Process

Hoffmann
Kiln

6

7

8

Extrusion
with
De-Airing:
Columbian
Adaptation

Extrusion
without
De-airing

Manual
Molding

Natural
Drying

Natural
Drying

Natural
Drying

Natural
Drying

Intermittent
Kiln

Intermittent
Kiln

Intermittent
Kiln

Intermittent
Kiln

*Only the single firm in Category 1 dries all of its output artificially

-6The procedu re for determ ining capita l-inten sity is clearly an ap
proxim ation.

However, it is believe d that this aethod gives a better

approx imation than could be obtaine d directl y from the individ ual firms,
since they did not have a very good idea of the value of their capita l.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIZE AND CAPITAL-INTENSITY
Size was not used in the determ ination of the catego ries.

However,

size proved to be strongl y correla ted with capita l-inten sity of catego
ry.
Two measur es of size were used:
output .

2 to

2

a. 3

total employment and value of capaci ty

Quanti tative inform ation was availab le for 47 firms in catego ries
The correla tion between size and capita l-inten sity as measure d by

catego ry is
Kendal l
correla tion
coeffic ient
size measure d by employment
by value of capaci ty output

Signifi cance
Levels

-0.5261

.001

-0.6160

.001

The factory in categor y 1 is known to be the largest brick factory in
Colomb ia; therefo re, its inclusi on would strengt hen the result.

WAGE VARIATIONS ACROSS SIZE OF FIRM
As

expecte d, average produc tion wages were found to increas e with

size of firm.

In this section , we discuss some of the possib le reasons

-7for s_uch variations and then test them empirically.
1)

The money wage might vary because characteristics of the job vary with

size of firm.

In the brick industry, temperature conditions under which

workers operate are usually less harsh in firms which have continuous
kilns.

Excavation by machine is less arduous than manual work.

However,

pleasantness of working conditions and size are both correlated with
capital-intensity of technology, so this factor would tend to operate
in the direction of lower wages for larger firms.
2)

The productivity of workers may vary across firms because of a

difference in turnover rates.

The firm may have a choice ai:oong various

combinations of turnover rates and wage rates, with a tradeoff between
wages and marginal productivity caused by the effect of the turnover
rates on the stability of the labor force.

Large firms may have chosen

the higher wage, lower turnover option to a greater extent than small firms. 4
3)

Large firms may be paying higher wages in order to obtain a more skilled

labor force.

According to local brick industry experts, there is little

difference in skill level required for the different types of jobs in the
factory, across categories or within an individual firm.

Workers are

usually rotated from one job to another within the factory.

In the survey,

most of the employers said that they were willing to hire inexperienced
workers and to the extent that there was any variation by technology
category and size of firm, it was the smaller, less capital-intensive
firms that were unwilling.
4)

5

The labor market may be segmented into geographical regions by mobility

cost~ variations in minimum wage legislation or variations in the cost of

-8living.

Finn size and location may be correlated in such a way that large

firms tend to be located in higher wage areas.

In Colombia, there is a minimum wage, and it varies regionally.
However, the variation is between rural and urban areas, and all of the
firms in the sample were located in areas designated urban.

(Typically,

brick factories are clustered in areas with suitable clay deposits on the
outskirts of the major cities.)

Other locational factors are tested

below.
5)

Average wages may be higher in large firms because they are required

by law to provide higher fringe benefits.

Fringe benefits are a large

fraction of total wage costs in Colombian firms.

Government regulations

require the payment of certain fringe benefits; the regulations vary
somewhat by size of firm.

Large firms (measured in terms of total capital)

must pay higher annual bonuses.

Firms with more than 10 workers or net worth

of more than Col. $50,000 mus.t pay 6% of their payroll to the national
apprenticeship program

(SENA).

the social security program.

All firms must pay 6% of their payroll to

Probably more important than these variations

in laws across size of firm is the variation in the enforceability of the
laws across size of firm.

Small firms are more likely to evade laws

relating to social security tax and fringe benefits.
6)

Wages may vary across firms because of a differential impact of labor

unions on large firms compared to small firms.

6

The government regulates

the formation of unions, which are quite strong in Colombia.

All the

unions are enterprise tmions, although they may also be members of
broader associations; collective bargaining takes place on an individual
factory basis.

There is very strong legislation protecting the worker's job

-9security and the r~ght to strike, which makes the strike a powerful union
weapon.
According to law, there must be at least 25 people in a union before
there can be a union in a particula r factory.

Thus by law there is a

differenc e in the potential impact of unions by size of firm.

This

reinforce s the usual labor economics arguments about why tmions are likely
to be DDre important in larger firms.
Detailed labor force data was available for 42 firms.

To examine

the influence of the above factors statistic ally, regressio ns were run
relating the differenc e between a firm's average productio n wage and the
average for the sample to variables measuring education , experienc e,
turnover rate, degree of unionizat ion and size of firm as well as variables
for geograph ical region, all in logged and unlogged form.
variables was significa nt except size of firm.
turnover frequentl y entered with the wrong sign.

None of these

Education , experienc e and
Size was generally

significa nt and the magnitude of the effect was substanti al.
measured by total employmen t, and by capacity output.

Size was

When included

together, employment became insignifi cant and the effect of size seemed
to be measured best by capacity output.
The regressio ns were also run with dummy variables for the individua l
categorie s included in addition to size.
cant.

These were not generally signifi

Table 2 gives some of the final regressio ns.
Average productio n wage was computed including only those workers

paid wages.

Since the employment of family members, not subject to laws

with respect to minimum wages and fringe benefits, is more important in

Table 2
Wage Regressio n Results
Dependen t Variable:
Average Hourly Wage of Productio n Workers by Firm--Ave rage for All Sample Firms

Unloi-i>ed Form
Independe nt Variables :

k:oefficie nt

Constant .
Total Workers
Capacity in ten thousands
Dummy Cat 2
Dummy Cat 3
Dummy Cat 4
Dummy Cat 5
Dummy Cat 6
Du11111y Cat 7

7.994
0,011
0.028
4.100
1.556
1.143
0,621
1.036
-0,971
R

Consta:1t
Capacity in ten thousands
Dummy Cat 2
DuDDDy Cat 3

2

Dummy Cnt 4

11.86
0.78
2.49
2.02
1.41
1.00

o. 72

1.02
-1.06

I

Coefficie nt
1.669
0.009
0.097
0.341
0.147
0.168
0.045
0.103
-0.107

13,36
3,61
1.96
1.39
1.08
0.83
1.06
-1.01

7,997
0,004
0.039
3,611
1.711
1,831
0.912
1.188
-0.793
2

R

l

Constant
I
I
Sales in hundred thousands
Dummy Cat 2
Dummy Cat 3
Dummy Cat 4
Dummy Cat 5
Dummy Cat 6
Dummy Cat 7

•

2

R

1.944
-0.004
0.101
0.324
0.164
0.182
0.060
0.099
-0.101

9.46
-0.05
1.79
1.39
1.31
1.54
0.61
0.86
-0.96

2
R • ,5035

,5055

• ,5050

11,17
3.56
1.58
1.19
1.45
0.48
0.93
-1.05

2
R • 0.5152

11.32
0,18
1.63
1.54
1.48
1.62
0.99
1.11
-0.82

8.034
0,042
3,459
1. 703
1.843
0,951
1.206
-o. 772

10.02
0.11
2.02
1.51
1.18
1.43
0.46
0.90
-1.04

1.676
0.102
0.338
0.145
0.168
0.047
0.104
-0.106

2
R • 0.5414

Constant
Total Workers
Sales in ~,,nrlrPrl thousand ~
Dummy Cat 2
Dummy Cat 3
Dummy Cat 4
Dummy Cat 5
Dummy Cat 6
Dummy Cat 7

t-Statist ic

R2 • .5154

• 0,5498

8.205
0,033
3,934
1.527
1.224
o. 712
1.069
-o. 926

Dummy Cat 5
Dummy Cnt 6
Dummy Cat 7

Loc>P-ed Form

t-Statist ic

12,04
3.09
1.61
1.50
1.65
1.08
:1.15
-0.82

1.935
0.099
0.326
0.165
0.181
0.060
0.099
-0.102

20.91
3.40
1.45
1.34
1.56
0.62
0.87
-1.00
2

R

• ,5035
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the smaller firms, the actual average for those firms is lower.

In addition,

if there are biases in the data, firms paying very low wages would be more
likely to overstate their true wages and fringe benefits in the aurvey to
conceal the fact that they were paying less than legally required.

There

fore, the sample data if anything understate the spread of wages across size
of firm.
Since we did not have wage data for category 1, we could not include
it in the regressions.

What qualitative evidence we have suggests that

this is a high wage firm.

Thus wages for this category are likely to

follow the same pattern, except that skill probably does have some effect
on the wage in this firm.

(See note 5)

We conclude that wage rates do increase with size ef firm and the
effect depends on the size of firm as measured by capacity output.

The wage

differential does not merely reflect a difference in the productivity of
the workers, to the extent that we have succeeded in measuring potential
differences in terms of education, experience and stability.

It does

not reflect a difference in the attractiveness of the job, since the
dummy variables on category were insignificant, and in any case, that
factor would tend to operate in the opposite direction.
Unionization was not significant in the regressions, but we think
that it is more important in determining the outcome than this result
suggests.
unionized.

Firms which are not tmionized still have to worry about becoming
According to qualitative statements in the interviews, firms

frequently pay higher wages in order to avoid unionization.
union shops; workers are not required to belong to the union.

There are no
The variable

-12measuring unionization is the percentage of workers who belong, and workers
will be less likely to join if they are already satisfied with wages.

The

likelihood of unionization is greater for the larger firms, especially
given the flat rule which sets a minimum number of members for the union.
The fact that wages increase with size of firm would, by itself, imply
that the longrun cost curve for any prospective entrant would be such that
larger output would be associated with greater capital-intensi ty.

However,

this does not explain the long term coexistence of large and small firms.
We turn now to variations in capital access across firms, and
argue that the structure of the Colombian capital market is sufficient to
explain this coexistence.

VARIATIONS IN CAPITAL ACCESS ACROSS SIZE OF FIRM
It is frequently argued that large firms have more favorable
access to capital than small firms since they are better credit risks.
One might say that the rental rate on capital paid by the firm is a
decreasing function of output, just as the wage rate is an increasing function
of output.

From the point of view of model-building, the decision on the

optimal scale of plant would involve balancing increasing unit cost of
labor against decreasing unit cost of capital as output increased.

There

could be longrun coexistence of large firms and small firms with the same
unit costs, and such that capital-intensi ty was positively correlated with
size.

However the question of technology choice which is to be embodied
in long-lived capital seems most natural in the context of a new entrant

-13into the industry.

In this context, it seems odd to think that the bigger

the plant the entrepreneur wants to build, the lower the interest rate he
has to pay.

We

argue below that it is more natural to think of each

prospective entrant as facing a horizontal or, more likely, upward-sloping
supply curve of capital but one which varies systematically across
entrepreneurs.

Then variation in technology choice and size of firm is

correlated with the characteristics of entrepreneurs which affect their
access to capital.
It was much more difficult to obtain reliable quantitative information
Therefore the discussion

from firms on their capital access than on labor use.

below is based on qualitative evidence from the interviews and on information
about interest rates and lending policies from secondary sources, including
7
publications of the financial institutions themselves.
The capital market structure in Colombia is very imperfect.

There

is a major division in the market between the formal or institutional
credit market, and the parallel or extrabank market.

The formal market,

composed of the usual financial intermediaries such as the commercial
banks, savings and loan institutions, and development banks, is subject
to extensive government control.

There are portfolio requirements, which

require that certain percentages of the reserves of financial institutions
be held in the form of particular assets.

Interest rates and terms of
(Given

lending are controlled, at rates well below market-clearing rates.

the rate of inflation, at times the real interest rate has been negative).
There is extensive rationing.

Interest rate policy is used as an instru

ment to channel funds into particular sectors; the rates and lending
terms differ for different borrowers and different loan purposes.

The

stock market is underdeveloped and relatively few companies are listed.

-14An

elaborate structure of control has existed for a long period,

at least two decades.

As a result, an extensive parallel mark.et has grown

up, in which market forces set interest rates and the terms of lending.

This

market is not itself illegal, although some of the transactions in it are
probably illegal, since they lend themselves to tax evasion.

The market

is well-organized; although it is called "extrabank" it does in fact
make use of banking system instruments for collateral.

The rates in the

extrabank market are much higher than the controlled rates, and almost
anyone can borrow at some interest rate.

The higherrates reflect greater

risk to some extent, but since overhead costs are low and the market is
not illegal they primarily reflect market forces and the scarcity of
capital in Colombi~, which is obscured by the artificially controlled
rates in the institutional market.
The structure described means that each entrepreneur (or set of as
sociates) considering a project has a capital access f\lllction which can be
quite complicated, given rationing and different interest rates for
different uses.

Capital access does depend to some extent on the nature

of the project the entrepreneur has in mind.

Formal credit lines

generally require the security of a machine or building and thus to some
extent discriminate in favor of capital-intensity.

Credit terms tend to

be better for imported machinery than for domestic machinery, since the
former comes from large international companies with favorable access to
capital themselves, and the latter is generally made in small Colombian
workshops, which have poor access to capital.

Of course any lender will

be interested in the ability of the borrower to repay the loan, which
means that he is interested in the profitability of the project.

-15However, while the nature of the project matters, the characte ristics
of the borrower are much more important .

Colombian society is oligarchi cal.

Those at the top of the oligarchy are related to others at the top.

They

can raise share capital through the issue of public shares or through family
connectio ns.

They have the proper credentia ls to obtain large amounts of

credit easily at favorable rates through the commercia l banking system.
The largest brick firm in the country which has the factory in category 1
is part of a large financial group which includes banking interests and
two giant construct ion companies •

The construct ion companies had extremely

favorable access to capital during the period in which that factory was
built, because of governmen t policy favoring construct ion
Entrepren eurs of middle class origin have the education al
backgroun d to obtain loans from special governmen t credit lines for small
and medium size industry, at concessio nal rates.

These credit lines have

the express purpose of increasin g access to credit for those who are at
a disadvant age in the normal sources.

to provide detailed accountin g data.

But the credit requires the firm
This adds a substanti al cost element

for the smaller firms, which are usually operated by people with little
education and no accountin g ability.

Therefore , there is a bottom group of

entrepren eurs whose only practical credit access is the extrabank market,
at very high interest rates.
These entrepren eurs do, however, have an asset which has a low opportunity cost, namely their own and their family members' labor.

To the

extent that a project is such that they can transform their labor directly
into capital, they can bypass the capital market.

This is particula rly

important , in the brick industry, in the case of category 8, in which the

-16initial investment is low and a substantial fraction of it can be built
with the entrepreneur's own labor.
The capital access function depends on characteristics of the entre
preneur for the above reasons, and also because the credit market's estimate
of the profitability of the project will depend on characteristics of the
entrepreneur.

A higher level of education will be considered necessary for

more complex projects.

Equally important, given the extensive reliance

in Colombia on quantity adjustments in markets and non-price allocation,
the entrepreneur's "connections" will be important in determining the
profitability of a project.
We hypothesize that this capital access schedule of each prospective
industry entrant is a rising one, with the interest rate increasing with
the arount of capital.

This is not so much because individual credit

sources raise their interest rates but because the entrepreneur reaches
the limit of his ration for each source and has to tum to a higher cost
source.

A

SIMPLE MODEL
In this section we present a simple model of the relationship between

the capital and labor market structure described above and technology choice.

Let the wage rate paid by the firm be

w

s

w(Q), with w'(Q) > O.

(1)

-17-

Let the marginal cost of capital to the firm, m, be a function of
total capital Kand a shift parameters, which is a function of characteristics
of the entrepreneur.

The shift parameter is measured so that the larger is

s, the better the entrepreneur's access to capital.

m(K,s)

am

:> O

am
as

-

aK

(Figure 1)
(2)

< 0

(3)

The function m(K,s) is a continuous approximation to a step-functl.on, which
represents the assumption that the firm is charged a constant interest
rate by each source of funds but the total amount borrowed from that source
is rationed.

The cost function of a prospective entrant into the industry

is derived by minimizing

Ca w(Q). L +

JK

m(K,s)dK

(4)

0

subject to Q • F(K,L), the production function.
The first order conditions are:
w(Q)

(5)

m(K,s)
and

Q • F(K,L)

(6)

which define a family of cost functions
K*(Q,s)

C(Q,s) • w(Q) • L*(Q,s) +

f

0

m(K,s)dK

(7)

-18-

m(K,s)

Figure 1

-19What do these cost functions look like?
In the case of a constant returns to scale production function,
the average cost and marginal cost curves will still be upward-sloping for

a givens, so that even with perfect competition, there will be an optimal
size of firm.

If there are increasing returns to scale, their effects

will be blunted by the increase in per unit labor and capital costs at
higher levels of output.
The assumptions made are not sufficient to imply that the capital
labor ratio will vary in a systematic way with the level of output for any
given cost curve.
though

Assume that the production function is homothetic (al

it need not be constant returns to scale) so that there is no

capital or labor-using bias in the production function itself as Q increases.
The first order conditions require that

Both wand m

w(Q)
m(K,s)

increaaealong the ray; depending on their relative rates of increase, the

cost-minimizing capital labor ratio may increase, decrease, or remain
the same. (Figure 2)
Consider what happens to the optimal size of firm and the degree
of capital-intensity of the firm as capital access improves.

The

marginal cost function is:
MC• w(Q)

dL*
+ L*(Q,s)w'(Q) +
W

oK*

m[K*(Q,s),s]w

At the profit-maximizing point K , L0 , Q0 , whatever product
0
market conditions are, costs are minimized; and

w(Q )
0
m(K , s )
0

(See Figure 3).

0

(8)
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Raise s

0

to s .

1

The lefthand side increases, since

am
as"

<

O.

Keeping

output constant and continuing to minimize cost implies increasing K and
decreasing L, and moving to some new point K , L •

1

1

Clearly

w(QO)
(K
m

o•so

)

<

w(QO)
m(K ,s )
1

and the marginal cost of capital is lower at the new point.
The marginal cost of labor holding output constant is unchanged
at w(Q ), and the effect on labor costs of increasing output, holding
0
employment constant, is now smaller given the smaller labor force.
(9)

Therefore, marginal cost has unambiguously decreased, and output will be
increased.

The postulated shift in capital access does increase the

optimal size of firm although the extent of the increase obviously depends
on market conditions.
What happens to capital-intensi ty?
production function.

Again, assume a homothetic

The above assumptions are not sufficient in themselves

to guarantee that the capital-intensi ty of production will change, once
the firm can adjust output as well as capital and labor.
represent the new equilibrium.

Let K2 , 1 , Q
2
1

If the K/L ratio is unchanged or decreases,

then it must be true that

(10)

or
m(K2,sl) > w(Ql)

m(K ,s ) = w(Q )
0
0 0
(See Figure 4).

(11)

1
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L

Figure 4
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The marginal cost of capital must be higher in the new equilibrium , and
the proportiona l change in the wage

actually paid must be less than or

equal to the proportiona l change in the margi~l cost of capital actually
faced.

Although the capital mark.et structure described above could

generate this outcome, observation suggests the large capital-inte nsive
firms.do in fact have a lower marginal cost of capital than the smaller
firms.

The lender of last resort is the extrabank market.

There is

less use of this market by the firms in the 110re capital-inte nsive
categories and the extrabank market offers more favorable interest rates
to the type of entrepreneu r that has a higher s.
Given this observation , the model predicts the pattern we observe:
firms of varying sizes coexisting on a long term basis and such that size
is positively correlated with capital-int ensity.

VARIATIONS IN CAPITAL ACCESS OVER THE FIRM'S LIFETIME
Another way to model the assumption that large firms have better
access to capital than small firms is to assume that all prospective
entrants to the industry have the same initial capital access function but
it shifts over the firm's lifetime.

Once a firm is in existence, the

availabilit y of profits for reinvestmen t and the record of profitabili ty
established improve access to capital.

Firms of different capital-int ensi

ties and sizes are observed because industry structure is a snapshot of a
dynamic process.

The entrepreneu r entering the industry chooses an optimal

growth path for the firm, not an optimal size.

New firms are small and

labor-inten sive but they will grow up to be like the older, larger,
capital-inte nsive firms.
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To test this empiri cally, it would be useful to have inform ation
on the size and-ca tegory of each sample firm when establi shed.

It was

diffic ult to obtain good histori cal inform ation from the firms, particu
lar

ly the older ones.

We were able to obtain the age of the firm, the size

of the labor force at the end of the first year of operati on (but not
capaci ty output) arid the ages of the lBB.jor items of capita l equipm ent.
The data show that firms genera lly do grow over time.

The change in

the labor force is biased downward as an indicat or of change in firm
size, because of the slump in demand at the time of the survey; neverth
eless,

employment had increas ed for 36 of the firms and decreas ed for only 7
(unknown
for 5 firms).

Capita l equipm ent had genera lly been added over time; for

exampl e, many firms had built additio nal kilns.
If the catego ries represe nt a growth path, then age of firm and
curren t technol ogy catego ry (measur ed from most to least capital -intens
ive)
should be negativ ely correla ted.

The correla tion between {curren t)

catego ry and employment at the end of the first year of operati on should
be much weaker than the correla tion between categor y and curren t employm
ent.
The Kendal l correla tion coeffic ient between age of firm and categor y
is -0.2240 , with signifi cance level .021

(47 firms).

The more capita l

intensi ve firms do tend to be older, but the correla tion is not very strong.
The Kendal l correla tion coeffic ient between number of worker s at the end
of the first year and catego ry is -0.3550 , with signifi cance level .001
(for the 42 firms for which data was availab le) •

This is lower than the

correla tion between curren t employment and categor y (-0.526 1), but still
substa ntial.
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Table 3

Category

1

# of

# of firms
1cnown to
have started in

I ef firms
for whom initial

finns

same c.a tegory

c.ategory unknown

1

0

0

2

1

1

0

3

4

0

2

Others

1 started in
cat 4
0

2 started in

# of firms
set up in 70's
and oa tegory

0
0

2*

cat 4

4

7

5

1

5

9

6

3

0

5

6

4

3

1

0

3

7

10

6

4

0

3

8

12

12

0

0

8

48

33

11

4

24

Total

*Both started in category 4

1 started in
-cat 5

3
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The aore im.porta nt question is:

have the firms changed categor ies?

Do the categor ies represen t stages of growth or differen t types?

The data

were aufficie nt to identify an initial category for 37 of the 68 firms.
(The eleven which could not be given an initial category were the oldest
firms in the sample, as one might expect; all date from 1957 or earlier ).
Table 3 summari zes the most importan t informa tion.
Categor ies 3 and 4 are identica l except that Category 3 firms have
chaa.ber dryers which may be used to dry part of the output.

All the firms

in this category acquired their dryers after the start of the firm and at
about the same time (the early 70's),

So

all moved from Category 4 to 3

(and two firms may have moved from some other category since their initial
category could not be determin ed).

However, the general picture is not

one of firms moving from the least capital intensiv e categori es to the
most capital- intensiv e categor ies.

In the relative ly capital- intensiv e

categor ies (1 to 4), of the 13 firms, the majority ,, 6, started in the
same category .

Three started in the capital- intensiv e categor ies, the

initial categor ies of 3 are unknown, and the single exceptio n moved up
only one categor y.
It is interest ing to look at the subgroup of firms (24 firms;
one-hal f of the sample) that were establis hed during the construc tion
boom in the early 70's.

All of these firms are still in the same category

they started in except the two firms that moved from category 4 to 3.
The distribu tion of firms by category in this subgroup is not that differen t
from the distribu tion of firms in the sample as a whole.
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We conclude that while the data show that firms do grow over time,
this is not likely to be the main explanation for the different technology
choices represented by the categories.
Secondary source information on the capital market .tends to
corroborate this.

The capital access function for an individual firm

does depend on firm profitability and can be expected to shift downward
over the firm's lifetime, to some extent.

But the range of this shifting

is rather small compared to the difference in the level of the functions
across the types of entrepreneurs found in widely separated categories.
The capital access function depends heavily on characteristics of the
entrepreneur (social class, eduction, connections) which, given the
hierarchical structure of Colombian society, are relatively permanent.

CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown that, in the Colombian brick industry
there is a pattern of technology choice such that capital-intensi ty is
correlated with size.

It is argued that this pattern can be explained

by the structure of capital and labor markets.
vary positively with size of firm.

In the labor market, wages

Empirical evidence has been presented

showing that this is true even after correcting for the influence of
factors such as education, experience, stability of the labor force and
geographical location of firm.

In the capital market, it is argued that

capital access differs across entrepreneurs, according to characteristics
relating to their position in Colombian society.

These two features are

combined in a simple analytic model and it is shown that such a model
can generate the pattern observed.

-29Then this imperf ect market a:>del is compared to the hypoth esis
that capita l access improv es over a firm's lifetim e, and therefo re that
the technol ogy catego ries represe nt a growth path.

It is shown that while

firms do grow and sometim es do change from one categor y to a closely
related one, in genera l the evidenc e does not tend to suppor t the growth
path theory .
Since we have not discuss ed all the ways in which large capita l
intensi ve firms differ from small labor-i ntensiv e ones, discuss ion of
policy implic ations mtSt be tentati ve.

However, there is a prima facie

case for thinkin g that the smalle r, less capital -intens ive firms are more
social ly efficie nt, given the unemployment of labor and the scarcit y of
investm ent funds in Colomb ia.

In other words, the input market conditi ons

these entrepr eneurs face more accura tely reflect social opport unity cost.
The feature s of the input market s describ ed are long term structu ral
elemen ts; therefo re, there is every reason to think that the pattern of
technol ogy choice will persis t, unless these structu ral elemen ts change
.
To a consid erable extent , these elemen ts are the result of govern 
ment policie s which should be change d.

Capita l market reform: , in the form

of the elimin ation of restric tions on intere st rates and terms of lending
,
is particu larly import ant.

Even after such a reform, there would probab ly

still be differe nces in capita l access functio ns across prospe ctive entran
ts
into an industr y, because of differe ntial risk factors , but the differe
nce
would be narrow er, and would more closely reflec t real econom ic forces.
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*por tions of this resea rch were suppo rted by the Agenc
y for
Inter natio nal Development and the Edna McConnell Clark
Foun
datio
n.
The colla bora tion of FICITEC (Fund acion para el Fome
nto de la Inve stiga cion
Cien tifica y Tech nolog ies) of Bogo t4, Colombia and
the
indu stry manu factu rers and consu l tants were very impo coop eratio n of brick
rtant . The resea rch
assis tance of Elean or Sylva n and typin g of Joann Young
are grate fully
ackno wledg ed, as are the comments of Mart in Baily
and my colle ague s at
the Economic Growth Cent er. Of cours e, the respo nsibi
lity for the views
expre ssed in this paper is my own.
1

Since more capit al-in tensi ve categ ories tend to use
more
impo rted mach inery , and histo rical ly, the Colombian
excha nge rate
bas gene rally been overv alued , the use of socia l
oppo rtuni ty cost
price s inste ad of Colombian peso price s would not
chang e the order
of the categ ories and would incre ase the dispe rsion
of the capi tal
inten sitie s.
2

Capa city outpu t was defin ed as the value of outpu t
that the
firm would be willi ng and able to produ ce, on a long
term basis , with
no more than a 5% addit ional expe nditu re on plant
and equip ment , and
with as many addit ional work ers as would be neede d
(assu ming that they
could be hired at the curre nt wage rate, and that
all outpu t could be
sold at curre nt price s). Since the indu stry was expe
rienc ing an un
antic ipate d slump , which was havin g uneve n effec ts
acros s the indu stry,
it is felt that capa city outpu t is the best measu re
of size of firm
avail able.
3

Tbe data is for the year 1975 and was colle cted in
an inter view
surve y of a samp le of brick firms condu cted by FICIT
EC. Furth er deta ils
of the data are avail able upon reque st to autho r.
4 1n

the Colombian conte xt, there is an advan tage as well
as a
disad vanta ge to a high turno ver. Since it is diffi
cult to lay off or
fire work ers, once they have become perm anent emplo
yees (afte r three
months of employment) the firm does not have as much
vary its labor force in respo nse to chang es in deman flexi bilit y to
d as neoc lassi cal
theor y would sugg est. If there is a high volun tary
turno ver, the firm
can contr act its labor force more easil y in perio ds
of slack demand.
Smal ler firms may be more subje ct to such shift s in
demand and this
could expla in a diffe renti al choic e on their part
of the low wage,
high turno ver optio n.
5A

pote ntial excep tion 1s the case of the the firms in
categ ories
1 and 2 which have tunne l kilns and tunne l drye rs.
These proce sses
norm ally requ ire skill ed labor to moni tor and adjus
t
setti ngs. Altho ugh we have no surve y data for Categ the temp eratu re
ory 1, we know that

-31this firm does have a aore highly skilled labor force and a complex
system of controls. The firm in category 2 has a production manager
with an engineering degree, and is one of only a few such firas. How
ever its production labor force is not any 110re skilled than that in
the other categories, and the firm does not in fact adjust the kiln
and dryer controls in the manner necessary for maximum technical efficiency.
In other words, it seems to have chosen a lower level of technical ef
ficiency and a lower level of skill of the labor force.
6

For a discussion of labor unions in Colombia, see Urrutia

(1969).
7
The most important sources

used are given in the references.
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